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Abstract
In this work, we focus on strategies to influence the opinion dynamics of a well-connected society. We propose a
generalization of the popular voter model. This variant of the voter model can capture a wide range of individuals including
strong-willed individuals whose opinion evolution is independent of their neighbors as well as conformist/rebel individuals
who tend to adopt the opinion of the majority/minority.
Motivated by political campaigns which aim to influence opinion dynamics by the end of a fixed deadline, we focus
on influencing strategies for finite time horizons. We characterize the nature of optimal influencing strategies as a function
of the nature of individuals forming the society. Using this, we show that for a society consisting of predominantly strong-
willed/rebel individuals, the optimal strategy is to influence towards the end of the finite time horizon, whereas, for a society
predominantly consisting of conformist individuals who try to adopt the opinion of the majority, it could be optimal to
influence in the initial phase of the finite time horizon.
I. INTRODUCTION
Opinion dynamics have been a subject of study in various fields including sociology, philosophy, mathematics, and
physics for a very long time [1]. In this work, we focus on a variant of a widely studied binary opinion dynamics model
known as the voter model [2], [3]. In the voter model, society is modeled using a graph where each individual is a node and
edges represent links between these individuals. Each individual holds one of two possible opinions, e.g., pro-government
and anti-government. The opinions of individuals evolve over time. Assuming time is slotted, one individual is chosen
uniformly at random at the beginning of each time-slot. This individual then adopts the opinion of one of its neighbors,
chosen uniformly at random. The voter model is a useful framework to study opinion dynamics and the spread of competing
epidemics. Variants and generalizations of the voter models have also been studied [4], [5].
Our model differs from the voter model in two key ways. Firstly, in each time-slot, the opinion of the selected individual
evolves according to a general function of the opinion of its neighbors. This modification to the voter model allows us
to model a variety of natures of individuals in society. For example, we can model strong-willed individuals by making
the opinion evolution of the selected individual independent of the opinions of its neighbors. Similarly, we can model
conformist and rebel individuals when the selected individual tends to adopt the opinion of the majority and minority
A preliminary version of this work appeared in [6].
2respectively. Secondly, we focus on the setting where the graph between the individuals is a complete graph. This is
justified in the presence of social media platforms like Twitter and the abundance of publicly available poll results on most
important issues.
Use of social networks and other media outlets for political campaigning and advertising is on the rise. While opinions
of individuals evolve organically over time, this evolution can be influenced by effective campaigning. Resource limitations
like a fixed budget or limited manpower restrict the set of feasible influencing strategies and motivate the need to use
available resources efficiently.
In political campaigning, the goal is to influence as many individuals as possible by the end of a fixed deadline. Motivated
by this, we focus on designing influencing strategies that maximize the number of individuals with a positive opinion at
the end of a known and finite time horizon [7]. The optimal influencing strategy is one that maximizes the number of
individuals with a favorable opinion at the end of this time horizon.
Most political campaigns tend to ramp up their advertising as the election gets closer. This strategy intuitively makes
sense as once influenced by the advertisements towards the end of the time horizon, there is very little time for individuals
to change their opinions. In this work, the goal is to understand if this advertising strategy is always optimal for our
stylized model.
The key takeaway from this work can be summarized as follows. For a society consisting primarily of strong-willed
individuals who are unaffected by the opinion of their peers but are susceptible to external influence or rebels who tend
to adopt the opinion of the minority, the optimal influencing strategy is to influence towards the end of the finite time
horizon. Contrary to this, if individuals are heavily influenced by their peers and are likely to adopt the opinion of the
majority, in some cases, it is optimal to influence at the beginning of the time horizon. Intuitively, this is because increasing
the fraction of individuals with a favorable opinion at the beginning of the finite time horizon has a cascading effect on
opinions of the society as a whole. In addition, we also conclude that influencing at the beginning of the time horizon
tends to be more effective than influencing at the end only when individuals with a favourable opinion are less likely to
change their opinion than individuals with an unfavourable opinion.
A. Related Work
Closest to our setting, [5] focuses on the voter model and generalizes it to include external influences. The key takeaway
is that the effect of external influences overpowers node-to-node interactions in driving the network to consensus in the
long term. In [4], the focus is on studying the effect of stubborn agents, i.e., agents who influence others but do not change
their opinion, on the opinion dynamics of the network. The authors also study the problem of optimal placement of these
stubborn agents to maximize the effect on the network.
Designing optimal influencing strategies has been the subject of study in many works including [7]–[10]. Refer to [10]
for a detailed survey of various works in this domain. Unlike our work, most of these works focus on the infinite time
3horizon setting. In [7], the focus is on characterizing the optimal influence strategy to maximize the spread of an epidemic
in a network. In [8], the focus is on minimizing the cost incurred by the influencer to reach a fixed fraction of nodes in
the network. In [9], the authors propose a general model of influence propagation called the decreasing cascade model
and analyze its performance with respect to maximizing the spread of an idea. In [10], the focus is on designing optimal
advertising strategies in the presence of multiple advertising channels.
A related body of work focuses on preventing the spread of disease/viruses in networks (refer to [11]–[13] and the
references therein). Our work differs from this body of work since we focus on strategies to increase the spread of
favorable opinion in the network.
In [14]–[16], the focus is on analyzing the performance of various rumor spreading strategies. These works do not focus
on finding the optimal strategies for information spread.
B. Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we formally define our opinion dynamics model. In Section
III, we discuss some preliminary results on stochastic approximation which are used in the subsequent analysis. In Section
IV, we state and discuss our main results. The proofs of the results discussed in Section IV are provided in Section V.
We conclude the paper in Section VI. Some additional results are presented in the appendix.
II. SETTING
We consider a finite population of M individuals, where each individual has a binary opinion (“Yes” or “No”) about a
certain (fixed) topic of interest. The opinion of each individual evolves over time. We assume the presence of an external
influencing agency with a limited budget which tries to shape the opinion of the population over time.
We assume that time is slotted and label the individuals in the population from {1, . . . ,M}. We define random variables
{Ii(t)}1≤i≤M,t≥0 taking values in {0, 1}, where Ii(t) denotes the opinion of the ith individual in time-slot t. Thus,
Ii(t) =

1 if the opinion of ith individual at time t is Yes
0 if the opinion of ith individual at time t is No.
Let Y (t) =
M∑
i=1
Ii(t) and N(t) = M − Y (t) denote the total number of people at time t with the opinion “Yes” and “No”
respectively.
At each time t, an individual (say it) is chosen uniformly at random from the population of M individuals. The opinion
4of the chosen individual it evolves in time-slot t according to a Markov process with the following transition probabilities.
P (Iit(t+ 1) = 0|Iit(t) = 1) = pt
P (Iit(t+ 1) = 1|Iit(t) = 1) = 1− pt
P (Iit(t+ 1) = 1|Iit(t) = 0) = qt
P (Iit(t+ 1) = 0|Iit(t) = 0) = 1− qt.
The values of pt and qt depend on whether the individual is being externally influenced in time-slot t or not. If the
chosen individual is being externally influenced in time-slot t, pt = p˜ and qt = q˜, else, their opinion evolves in one of the
following three ways.
– Type S (Strong-Willed): In this case, the chosen individual is not affected by their peers, more specifically, pt = p
and qt = q.
– Type C (Conformist): In this case, the probability of an individual changing their opinion increases with the fraction
of the population holding the opposite opinion, more specifically, pt = p
N(t)
M and qt = q
Y (t)
M .
– Type R (Rebel): In this case, the probability of an individual changing their opinion decreases with the fraction of
the population holding the opposite opinion, more specifically,
pt = p
(
1− N(t)M
)
and qt = q
(
1− Y (t)M
)
.
These three types of evolution capture three basic ways in which individuals interact with society. Since an individual can
also adopt a mixture of these approaches over time, we study two models which allow time-varying nature in individuals.
– Model I: Hybrid S/C
In each time-slot without external influence, opinion evolution of the chosen individual is Type S with probability λ
and Type C otherwise, independent of all past choices.
Note that at the two extreme values of λ, i.e., λ = 0 and λ = 1, the individuals are either only strong-willed or only
conformists. These special cases were studied in [6] along with an extension to the case of strong-willed population
with increasing adamancy with time. Some of the results in [6] can be obtained as special cases of results in this
paper.
– Model II: Hybrid C/R
In each time-slot without external influence, opinion evolution of the chosen individual is Type C with probability µ
and Type R otherwise, independent of all past choices.
We focus our attention on these two models since they are analytically tractable and lead to insightful results. The analysis
for the Hybrid S/R model is similar to that of Hybrid S/C and can be studied using the same tools.
For both these models, we focus on the evolution of opinion of the population over a time horizon of T consecutive
time-slots. The advertising agency can influence the opinion in at most bT of the T time-slots, where 0 < b ≤ 1. The
5goal of the advertising agency is to maximize the number of individuals holding the “Yes” opinion at the end of the T
time-slots. The agency needs to decide when to exert influence in order to achieve this goal.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce the mathematical framework used in the rest of this paper. The dynamics for random
variable N(t) (resp. Y (t)) are as follows.
N(t+ 1) = N(t) + χ(t+ 1), (1)
where, χ(t+1) is a random variable taking values in {−1, 0, 1} denotes the change in the net opinion of the population at
time t+ 1. Let Ft denote the σ-field generated by the random variables {χ(1), χ(2), . . . , χ(t)}. The evolution of opinion
is governed by the random process χ(t). We have:
P (χ(t+ 1) = x|Ft)
=

δN (t)qt for x = −1
(1− δN (t))pt for x = 1
1− pt − δN(t)(qt − pt) for x = 0,
(2)
where, δN (t) =
N(t)
M . Note that the χ(k)’s are conditionally independent. As metioned in Section II, the values of pt and
qt depend on whether the individual is being externally influenced in time-slot t or not. If the chosen individual is being
externally influenced in time-slot t, pt = p˜ and qt = q˜, else, their opinion evolves in one of the three ways described in
Section II.
Definition 1 (Optimal Strategy). We call a strategy optimal if the influence according to that strategy results in a larger
expected number of “Yes” at the end of time T than the expected number of “Yes” at the end of time T using any other
influence strategy.
If strategy S1 is better than strategy S2, it is denoted by S1 ≫ S2. Note that, for any strategy, the number of time-slots
that can be influenced is fixed. We want to find an optimal strategy, in the sense of definition 1, that identifies the time-slots
where the influence should be exerted. As we shall see in most cases, due to a monotone argument, it is sufficient to
compare the strategies of influencing in the first bT and the last bT time-slots respectively. We use the following definition
in the rest of the paper.
Definition 2 (Influence Strategies). df
– SF : The strategy to influence in the first bT time-slots.
– SL: The strategy to influence in the last bT time-slots.
6From the dynamics described above, the following lemma is immediate.
Lemma 1. Let δ ∈ (0, 1). Consider a family of random variables {χ(p,q)}, parametrized by p, q ∈ [0, 1], defined as
follows:
P (χ(p,q) = x) =

p(1− δ) if x = 1
qδ if x = −1
1− (1− δ)p− δq if x = 0.
(3)
Then if p1 > p2 and q1 < q2, χ
(p1,q1) stochastically dominates χ(p2,q2).
Proof. The assertion follows by noting that from (3), we have:
P (χ(p,q) > a) =

0 if a ≥ 1
p(1− δ) if 0 ≤ a < 1
1− qδ if − 1 ≤ a < 0
1 if a < −1.
In view of the above lemma and the fact that the total number of people with opinion “No” at time t is given by
N(t) = N(0) +
∑t
k=1 χ(k), we assume that the influencing agency is rational and only exerts influence in a way that
leads to maximizing the expected number of people with “Yes” opinion at the end of time T (or equivalently, minimizing
the expected number of people with “No” opinion at the end of time T ). More precisely, we assume the following:
Assumption A (Rational Influence). We assume that the external influence is such that p˜ < q˜.
To analyze the evolution of random variable δN (t), denoting the fraction of people with opinion “No” at time t, we use
the theory of stochastic approximation.
The classical stochastic approximation scheme is given by the following iteration for x ∈ Rd
x(n+ 1) = x(n) + a(n) [h(x(n)) +M(n+ 1)] , n ≥ 0, (4)
such that:
(i) {a(n)} is a positive step-size sequence satisfying
∑
n
a(n) =∞,
∑
n
a(n)2 <∞.
(ii) h : Rd → Rd is Lipschitz.
(iii) {Mn}n≥0 is a square-integrable Martingale difference sequence with respect to a suitable filtration.
7Then, Theorem 2, Chapter 2 [17] implies that under certain conditions on the boundedness of the trajectories, the iterates
of (4) track the following O.D.E. asymptotically with probability one
x˙(t) = h(x(t)), t ≥ 0. (5)
Stochastic Approximation finds use in several problems in machine learning, urn models, reinforced random processes etc.
We rewrite (1) as a constant step-size stochastic approximation scheme for the fraction of “No”s at time t.
δN (t+ 1) = δN (t) +
1
M
E[χ(t+ 1)|Ft]
+
1
M
[χ(t+ 1)− E[χ(t+ 1)|Ft]].
Conditions (ii) and (iii) from above are easily verified. From the theory of stochastic approximation, we know the solutions
of the above system track the solutions of the O.D.E. δ˙N(t) =
1
ME[χ(t + 1)|Ft]. Therefore, from (2), we get that the
opinion dynamics is governed by the O.D.E.:
Mδ˙N(t) = (1− δN (t))pt − δNqt. (6)
Observe that we have a constant step-size Stochastic Approximation scheme here and Condition (i) discussed above is not
satisfied. There has been some recent work on constant step-size stochastic approximation schemes. We refer the readers
to [18], [19]. A larger step-size, scaled by say K > 1, results in faster convergence of the O.D.E., whereas a smaller
step-size would mean that the O.D.E. trajectory will track the difference equation better.
The theory of stochastic approximation says that the solutions of the recursion remain close to the solution of the
corresponding O.D.E. at t→∞. However, since the Markov chain N(t) mixes fast, concentration of measure arguments
(see Appendix) can be invoked to show that the solution of the recursion stays close to the solution of the O.D.E.
throughout (minus a small burning time). For instance, Figure 1 shows that the O.D.E. corresponding to the constant
stepsize stochastic approximation scheme tracks the difference equation well throughout for one such setting. Thus, it is
sufficient to understand the optimal strategies of the influencing agent for the O.D.E. system. In the following sections,
we discuss various cases and obtain optimal influencing strategies for the corresponding O.D.E.s.
IV. MAIN RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We first discuss our results for Model I.
A. Model I: Hybrid S/C
In this section, we characterize the optimal influence strategies for the Hybrid S/C case. Recall that this means that
in each time-slot when there is no external influence, the opinion of the randomly chosen individual evolves as Type S
(strong-willed) with probability λ and Type C (conformist) with probability 1− λ.
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Figure 1: Comparison between SL and SF for M = 100, T = 10000, b = 0.4, p = 0.8, q = 0.4 and p˜ = 0.1, q˜ = 0.9 as
a function of time for Model I with λ = 0.5. The O.D.E. corresponding to the constant stepsize stochastic approximation
scheme tracks the difference equation well for all values of t.
Recall from Definition 2 that SL and SF are strategies to influence in the last and first bT time-slots respectively.
Theorem 1. For Model I defined in Section II and under Assumption A, if the advertiser has a budget of bT time-slots
for 0 < b < 1,
(i) If p = q, then, ∀λ ∈ (0, 1], SL is optimal and for λ = 0, all strategies perform equally well.
(ii) If p > q, then, ∀λ ∈ [0, 1] and for T = ω(M) or T = o(M), SL is the optimal strategy.
(iii) If p < q,
a) for T = ω(M), ∀λ ∈ (0, 1], SF is optimal and for λ = 0, all strategies perform equally well;
b) for T = o(M), ∃λ∗ ∈ [0, 1] such that SF is optimal and SL is strictly sub-optimal when λ < λ∗, SL is optimal
when λ > λ∗, and if λ = λ∗, both strategies SF and SL perform equally well.
To discuss Theorem 1 from a qualitative perspective, we introduce a property called the stickiness of an opinion. For
a given value of the fraction of the population holding the same opinion as that of the individual chosen in a time-slot,
the stickiness of that opinion is the probability that the chosen individual does not change their opinion by the end of
the time-slot. Under this definition, for Type S individuals, the stickiness of the Yes opinion is 1− p and that of the No
opinion is 1− q.
The main takeaway from Theorem 1 is that it is strictly sub-optimal to influence at the end of the time horizon when
the Yes opinion is more sticky than the No opinion and the probability of an individual being affected by their peers is
high. In addition, in this case, it is, in fact, optimal to influence right at the beginning of the time horizon. One way to
understand this phenomenon is as follows. When individuals are heavily influenced by their peers and people are less
likely to flip from Yes to No than from No to Yes, influencing the population at the beginning leads to a cascading effect
9which outperforms the strategy of influencing people at the very end which minimizes the probability of them switching
their opinion before the end of the time horizon.
In all other cases studied in Theorem 1, it is optimal to influence at the end of the time horizon. It is worth noting that
in all the cases discussed in Theorem 1, the nature of the optimal policy is independent of the state of the population at
the beginning of the time horizon.
We now present some simulation results to illustrate that the performance of our system mirrors the trends obtained by
solving the corresponding O.D.E. for this setting.
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Figure 2: Comparison between SL and SF for M = 10000, T = 10000, b = 0.4, p = q = 0.5 and p˜ = 0.1, q˜ = 0.9 for
different values of λ. The SL strategy outperforms the SF strategy for all values of λ.
In Figure 2, we compare the performance of the SL and SF strategies for the setting where p = q. The O.D.E. solution
is close to the simulated performance of the system. As discussed in Theorem 1, in this case, the SL strategy outperforms
the SF strategy for all values of λ.
In Figure 3, we compare the performance of the SL and SF strategies for the setting where p > q. The O.D.E. solution
is close to the simulated performance of the system. As discussed in Theorem 1, in this case, the SL strategy outperforms
the SF strategy for all values of λ.
In Figure 4, we compare the performance of the SL and SF strategies for the setting where p < q. The O.D.E. solution
is close to the simulated performance of the system. As discussed in Theorem 1, in this case, the SL strategy outperforms
the SF strategy for values of λ below a threshold and the SF strategy outperforms the SL strategy for values of λ over
the threshold.
Note that some of the results in Theorem 1 are restricted to the case when T = ω(M) and T = o(M) for analytical
tractability. We now present a result which holds for all T for the special case when a individual does not change their
opinion from Yes to No without external influence and the external influence is perfect, i.e., p˜ = 0, and q˜ = 1. While this
is a very limited case, our motivation behind discussing the result is to show that similar trends hold for general T .
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Figure 3: Comparison between SL and SF for M = 1000, T = 1000, b = 0.4, p = 0.8, q = 0.4 and p˜ = 0.1, q˜ = 0.9 for
different values of λ. The SL strategy outperforms the SF strategy for all values of λ.
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Figure 4: Comparison between SL and SF for M = 1000, T = 100000, b = 0.4, p = 0.4, q = 0.8 and p˜ = 0.1, q˜ = 0.9.
The O.D.E. solution is close to the simulated performance of the system. As discussed in Theorem 1, in this case, the SL
strategy outperforms the SF strategy for values of λ below a threshold and the SF strategy outperforms the SL strategy
for values of λ over the threshold.
Proposition 1. For Model I defined in Section II, if the advertiser has a budget of bT time-slots for 0 < b < 1, if
p = 0 and q > 0, and p˜ = 0, and q˜ = 1, then, ∀λ ∈ [0, 1) the strategy to influence in the first bT slots is optimal and is
strictly better than the strategy influencing in the last bT slots.
B. Model II: Hybrid C/R
In this section, we present our results for Model II. Recall that this means that in each time-slot when there is no
external influence, the opinion of the randomly chosen individual evolves as Type C (conformist) with probability µ and
Type R (rebel) with probability 1− µ.
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Theorem 2. For Model II defined in Section II and under Assumption A, if the advertiser has a budget of bT time-slots
for 0 < b < 1,
(i) For µ < 1/2, SL ≫ SF for T = o(M) and T = ω(M).
(ii) For µ > 1/2,
a) If T = o(M), SF ≫ SL if p < δN (0)
2
1−δN (0)2 q and µ >
δ2N (0)
2δ2
N
(0)−p/(p+q) , and SL ≫ SF otherwise.
b) If T = ω(M), SL ≫ SF .
(iii) For µ > 1/2 and p = δN (0)
2
1−δN (0)2 q, for T = o(M) or T = ω(M), all strategies perform equally well.
We conclude that in the Hybrid C/R setting, the strategy to influence at the beginning of the time-frame outperforms
the strategy to influence at the end in a very limited case. This happens only when the time horizon is small, i.e., at most
a vanishing fraction of the individuals change their opinion, and the chosen individual in a time-slot is more likely to
conform than rebel, and the stickness of the Yes opinion is above a threshold which is a function of the initial state of the
population and the stickness of the No opinion.
We note that unlike Model I, in this case, in addition to the stickiness of the two opinions, the initial state of the
population determines which of the two strategies, namely, influencing right at the beginning of the time horizon and
influencing right at the end of the time horizon performs better.
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Figure 5: Comparison between SL and SF for M = 1000, T = 1000, b = 0.4, p = 0.2, q = 0.9 and p˜ = 0.1, q˜ = 0.9. In
this case, similar to that in Theorem 2 (ii), the SL strategy outperforms the SF strategy for values of µ below a threshold
and the SF strategy outperforms the SL strategy for values of µ over the threshold.
V. PROOFS
A. Proof of Theorem 1(i)
We consider the strategies SF and SL of influencing the first bT time-slots and the last bT time-slots respectively.
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Proposition 2. For Model I defined in Section II, if the advertiser has a budget of bT time-slots for 0 < b < 1, and p = q.
Then, for all values of the population split λ ∈ [0, 1], the strategy of influencing in the last bT time-slots is strictly better
than the strategy of influencing in the first bT time-slots, i.e. SL ≫ SF .
Proof. The expected fraction of “No”s at the end of time T under the strategies SF and SL are denoted by δSFN (T ) and
δSLN (T ) respectively.
We split the solution of the differential equation into two time-periods [0, bT ] and [bT, T ] depending on the presence
or absence of influence corresponding to each strategy. For strategy SF we have:
• 0 ≤ t ≤ bT : The differential equation is given by
Mδ˙N(t) = −δN (t)[p˜+ q˜] + p˜.
This can be solved to yield
δN (bT ) =
p˜
p˜+ q˜
+
(
δN (0)− p˜
p˜+ q˜
)
e−bT
p˜+q˜
M .
• bT ≤ t ≤ T : The corresponding differential equation is solved by integrating between bT and T . After simplification,
this gives us:
δSFN (T ) =
1
2
+
(
p˜
p˜+ q˜
− 1
2
)
e
−2λ
M
pT (1−b)
+
(
δN (0)− p˜
p˜+ q˜
)
e−
T
M
(2λp(1−b)+b(p˜+q˜)).
(7)
Similarly for the strategy SL, we obtain:
δSLN (T ) =
p˜
p˜+ q˜
+
(
1
2
− p˜
p˜+ q˜
)
e−bT
p˜+q˜
M
+
(
δN (0)− 1
2
)
e−
T
M
(2λp(1−b)+b(p˜+q˜)).
(8)
Comparing the expected fraction of number of people with “No” at the end of time T of SF and SL, we get:
δSFN (T )− δSLN (T ) =
(
1
2
− p˜
p˜+ q˜
)(
1− e−bT p˜+q˜M
)
(
1− e−2λM (pT (1−b)
)
. (9)
This is always positive whenever p˜ ≤ q˜. Thus, whenever p = q and p˜ ≤ q˜, the expression in equation (9) is a product of
positive terms and is therefore strictly positive for all λ, p, q,M and T .
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Remark 1. It is worthwhile to note that if the influencing agency exerts perfect influence i.e., p˜ = 0 and q˜ = 1, we obtain
δN (bT ) = δN (0)e
− bT
N , an exponential decay in the proportion of people who have a “No” opinion. When δN (t) is very
small, the differential equation governing δN(t) can be approximated by Mδ˙N(t) = pλ which indicates a linear increase
in δN (t).
We have only shown that SL ≫ SF . However, it turns out this is sufficient to conclude that under the conditions of
Proposition 2, SL is in fact the optimal strategy.
Proof of Theorem 1(i). Consider a strategy S and divide the time interval [0, T ] in three parts: [0, t− 1) be the first t ≥ 0
slots until a pair of slots is encountered where influence is followed by no influence, [t, t + 1] be the first pair of slots
(starting from t = 0) such that t is an influenced time-slot and t+ 1 is not, and finally (t+ 1, T ]. We consider a strategy
S ′ that differs from S only in the slots [t, t+ 1], where the influence and non-influence is swapped. It is immediate from
equations (7) and (8) that S ′ ≫ S. Inductively, we conclude that SL is optimal in the sense of Definition 1.
B. Proof of Theorem 1(ii)
In the absence of any influence, the differential equation is given by:
δ˙N (t) =− δ
2
N (t)
M
(1 − λ)(p− q)
+
δN (t)
M
[(1 − λ)(p− q)− λ(p+ q)]− λp
M
The quadratic equation δ2N (t)(1 − λ)(p − q) − δN(t)[(1 − λ)(p − q) − λ(p + q)] − λp has two roots; it can be easily
verified that the discriminant ∆ = (p−q)
2(1−λ2)+λ2(p+q)2
M2 > 0 for all values of λ, p and q. We denote the roots by A1
and A2, where A1 =
1
2
(
1 +
√
M2∆−λ(p+q)
(1−λ)(p−q)
)
and A2 =
1
2
(
1−
√
M2∆+λ(p+q)
(1−λ)(p−q)
)
. Note that A1 > A2. Solving the O.D.E.s
corresponding to SF and SL yields:
δSFN (T ) = A2 +
A1 −A2
D2
(10)
δSLN (T ) =
p˜
p˜+ q˜
(
1− e−bT p˜+q˜M
)
+ (A1 −A2)
(
e−bT
p˜+q˜
M
D1
)
A2e
−bT p˜+q˜
M (11)
where L = (1−λ)p−qM (A1−A2) and D1 and D2 are given by evaluating the expression 1−
(
ρ−A1
ρ−A2
)
e−LT (1−b)) evaluated
at ρ = δN(0) and ρ = δN (bT ) respectively. From equations (10) and (11), we get:
δ
SL
N (T )− δ
SF
N (T ) =
(
1− e−bT
p˜+q˜
M
)
×[(
p˜
p˜+ q˜
−A2
)(
1− e−LT (1−b)
(A1 − A2)
2
D1D2D3
)]
−
(
1− e−bT
p˜+q˜
M
) [
A1 − A2
D1D2
(
1− e−LT (1−b)
)]
(12)
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Remark 2. It can be shown that D1, D2 and D3 are always positive. Further, A1 ∈ (0, 1) and A2 ∈ (−∞, 0) with both
being decreasing functions in λ.
Simulations indicate that in this case SL ≫ SF . We prove this next for the cases when T = o(M) and T = ω(M). 2
That is, whenever the influencing agency is either able to reach almost no one in the population or able to reach almost
everyone, the strategy to influence in the last bT slots is strictly better than the strategy to influence in the first bT slots.
Lemma 2. For a system of M individuals and a time horizon of T time-slots, let E be the event that each individual
is influenced at least once in the time horizon of T time-slots and F be the event that the number of unique influenced
individuals is o(M). Then we have that,
If T = ω(M), lim
M→∞
P (E) = 1
and if T = o(M), P (F ) = 1.
Proof. If T = ω(M), the probability that an individual is not influenced is
(
1− 1M
)bT
. By the union bound,
P (E) ≥ 1−M
(
1− 1
M
)bT
=⇒ lim
M→∞
P (E) = 1.
If T = o(M), it trivially follows that the number of unique influenced individuals is upper bounded by bT = o(M).
Proof of Theorem 1(ii). Note that it is enough to show that SL ≫ SF since an argument on the lines of the proof of Part
(i) gives the optimality result. We consider the two regimes separately.
• T = ω(M): In this case, we have TL(1−b) = (1−λ)(p−q)(A1−A2)T (1−b)M . We can simplify the above expression
by noting that (A1 − A2)(1 − λ)(p − q) =
√
M2∆ =
√
(λ)2(p+ q)2 + (1− λ2)(p− q)2. Thus, e−LT (1−b) → 0.
Using this, we get that D1 ≈ 1, D2 ≈ 1 and D3 ≈ −A2(δN (0) − A2). The difference equation then collapses to
δSLN (T )−δSFN (T ) ≈ −A2− (A1−A2) = −A1. Since this is always negative, we see that the strategy SL outperforms
the strategy SF .
• T = o(M): In this case, we have e−LT (1−b) = e−
√
M2∆(1−b)(T/M). As T/M → 0, e−LT (1−b) ≈ 1− TM
√
M2∆(1−b).
This gives us D1 ≈ D2 and D3 ≈ (δN (0)−A2)2. By writing D1D2D3 as ((A1 −A2) + TM
√
M2∆(1− b)(δN (0)−
A1))
2,the first and second terms in the difference equation simplify significantly. Let ψ = (A1−A2)
2
((A1−A2)+ TM
√
M2∆(1−b)(δN (0)−A1))2
.
Then, the difference equation simplifies to
T
M
√
M2∆(1−b)ψ
A1−A2 (A1A2−(δN (0))2 which is negative for all λ. This is because
A1 > 0 but A2 < 0. Thus we get that the SL strategy is better than the SF strategy.
2We say that f(n) is o(g(n)) (or ω(h(n)) resp.) if for any real constant c > 0, there exists an integer constant n0 ≥ 1 such that f(n) < cg(n) (or
f(n) > ch(n) resp.) for every integer n ≥ n0.
2We write f(x) ≈ g(x) if f(x) = g(x) + O(x)
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C. Proof of Theorem 1(iii)
In this case, in the absence of influence, the differential equation can be rewritten as
δ˙N(t) =
δ2N(t)
M
(1− λ)(q − p)− δN (t)
M
[(1− λ)(q − p)
+ λ(p+ q)] +
λp
M
. (13)
This quadratic equation also has two distinct roots A′1 and A
′
2 given by A
′
1 =
1
2
(
1 +
√
N2∆+λ(p+q)
(1−λ)(q−p)
)
and A′2 =
1
2
(
1 + λ(p+q)−
√
N2∆
(1−λ)(q−p)
)
, where ∆ = (p−q)
2(1−λ2)+λ2(p+q)2
N2 is the discriminant. Solving like before, we observe that:
δSFN (t) = A
′
2 +
A′1 −A′2
D′2
(14)
δSLN (t) =
(
p˜
p˜+ q˜
)(
1− e−bT p˜+q˜M
)
+ A′2
(
e−bT
p˜+q˜
M
)
+ (A′1 −A′2)
(
e−bT
p˜+q˜
M
D′1
)
.
Thus we get:
δSLN (t)− δSFN (t)
=
(
1− e−bT p˜+q˜M
)
×[(
p˜
p˜+ q˜
−A′2
)(
1− eL′T (1−b) (A
′
1 −A′2)2
D′1D
′
2D
′
3
)]
−
(
1− e−bT p˜+q˜M
) [A′1 −A′2
D′1D
′
2
(
1− eL′T (1−b)
)]
, (15)
where L′ = (1 − λ)p−qN (A′1 − A′2) and D′1 and D′2 is the expression
[
1− (x−A′1)x−A′2 e
L′T (1−b)
]
evaluated at x = δN (0)
and x = δN (bT ) respectively. Also, D
′
3 = (δN (bT )−A′2)(δN (0)−A′2).
Observe that since the equation in (15) takes opposite signs at extremal values of λ, there exists a λ∗, which we call
the cross-over λ, such that for ǫ > 0, for λ in the neighbourhood (λ∗ − ǫ, λ∗ + ǫ), SF ≫ SL for λ < λ∗ and SL ≫ SF
for λ > λ∗. We show that for T = o(M) or ω(M), the crossover λ is unique.
Remark 3. It can be shown that A′1 ∈ [1,∞), A′2 ∈
[
0, pq+p
]
and both are increasing functions in λ. The variation of
D1, D2 and D3 is much more complex and depends on δN (0). In particular, if δN (0) > (
p
q+p )e
bT
M , all three are positive.
Proof of Theorem 1(iii). We compare the strategies SL and SF . An argument similar to that in the proof of Part (i) gives
us the optimality of the strategies in different regimes of λ. Again, we divide the proof into two cases:
• T = ω(M): In this case, TL′(1 − b) = (1 − λ)(p − q)(A′1 − A′2)T (1−b)M . We can simplify the above expression by
noting that (A′1 − A′2)(1 − λ)(p − q) =
√
M2∆ =
√
(λ)2(p+ q)2 + (1− λ2)(q − p)2. We can write the difference
16
equation as:
δ
SL
N (T )− δ
SF
N (T ) ≈ −A
′
2 + A
′
2e
L′T (1−b) (A
′
1 − A
′
2)
2
D′1D
′
2D
′
3
−
A′1 − A
′
2
D′1D
′
2
+
A′1 − A
′
2
D′1D
′
2
e
L′T (1−b))
which can be simplified to yield: δSLN (T )− δSFN (T ) ≈ A′2
[
e−L
′T (1−b)
(
1− A′2A′1
)
− 1
]
but we know that
A′2
A′1
< 1 for
all λ except when λ = 0 (since λ = 0 implies A′2 = 0). Thus the difference is always negative except when λ = 0.
Thus, in this case, λ∗ is 0 and unique.
• T = o(M): In this case, we have eL
′T (1−b) = e
√
M2∆(1−b)T/M . As T/M → 0, eL′T (1−b) ≈ 1 +
√
M2∆(1 − b) TM .
This gives us D′1 ≈ D′2 and D′3 ≈ (δN (0)−A′2)2. We can write D′1D′2D′3 = ((A′1−A′2)− xµ(δN (0)−A′1))2. Thus
reducing the first and second terms of the difference equation appropriately and plugging in, the difference equation
reduces to:
δSLN (T )− δSFN (T ) ≈
xµ
A′1 −A′2
[δ2N (0)−A′1A′2] (16)
A′1 and A
′
2 are both strictly increasing functions. A
′
1A
′
2 = 0 at λ = 0 and increases with λ. So, the difference in (16)
goes from positive to zero, becomes negative and then stays negative. Thus, λ∗ is unique.
D. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Note that this is the p < q case. From the discussion in Section V-C, we get that A′2 = 0. Also, D
′
1 > 1 and
D′2 > 1. With this simplification, the difference in (16) simplifies to:
δSLN (t)− δSFN (t) = (1− e−
bT
M )
e
Tq(1−b)
M
) − 1
(1 − λ)D′1D′2
(17)
which is positive except for λ ∈ [0, 1)
The performance gap of both strategies shrinks to 0 as λ → 1. This is consistent with the result obtained in [6] (See
Lemma 2 in [6]).
E. Proof of Theorem 2
The proof follows using the same tools used in the proof of Theorem 1. We omit the details due to lack of space.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we proposed a variant of the voter model which can be used to model variation in the nature of the
individuals in society. We evaluate the performance of campaigning strategies as a function of the nature of individuals
when the goal is to maximize the fraction of individuals with a favorable opinion at the end of a known finite time-horizon.
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We conclude that if individuals are mostly unaffected by the opinion of their peers or tend to go against the majority
opinion, influencing at the end of the finite time-horizon is optimal. In the case where individuals are affected by the
opinion of their peers and tend to adopt the opinion of the majority, influencing at the end of the finite time-horizon can
be strictly sub-optimal if an individual with a positive opinion is not very likely to change their mind when compared to
the probability of an individual with a negative opinion changing their mind.
Possible extensions of this work include modeling the connections between individuals in the society using a graph such
that individuals susceptible to being influenced by others are only influenced by their neighbors in this graph.
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APPENDIX: MARTINGALE CONCENTRATION
In this section, we use Concentration inequalities for Martingales to obtain a concentration results for fraction of people
with opinion “No”, for the p = q case and the influence is in the last bT time-slots for Model I. Similar arguments will
give the corresponding result for the strategy to influence in the first bT time-slots. We show that δN (T ) is close to the
solution of the corresponding O.D.E. in (6) at T . This justifies using the O.D.E. solutions to arrive at the optimal strategy
for the external influencing agency for the discrete time model.
Recall that for p = q (see (8)), for the strategy SL, for T sufficiently large, we get:
δN (T ) =
p˜
p˜+ q˜
+
(
1
2
−
p˜
p˜+ q˜
)
e
−bT
p˜+q˜
M
+
(
δN(0)−
1
2
)
e
−
T
M
(2λp(1−b)+b(p˜+q˜))
≈
p˜
p˜+ q˜
+
(
1
2
−
p˜
p˜+ q˜
)(
1−
p˜+ q˜
M
)bT
+
(
δN(0)−
1
2
)(
1−
p˜+ q˜
M
)bT (
1−
2λp
M
)(1−b)T
.
(18)
We denote this approximate solution by δapproxN . Then we have the following result.
Proposition 3. For Model I defined in Section II and under Assumption A, if the advertiser has a budget of bT time-slots
for 0 < b < 1, given ǫ > 0, ∃µ > 0, which is a function of the model parameters p, q, p˜, q˜, T, b and ǫ such that
P (|δN (T )− δapproxN | > ǫ) < µ.
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Proof. For t ∈ [(1 − b)T, T ], we have
E[δN (t+ 1)|Ft] = δN (t) + E[χ(t+ 1)|Ft]/M
= δN (t) + [(1− δN (t))p˜− δN (t)q˜]/M
= r˜δN (t) + p˜/M,
where r˜ = 1− (p˜+ q˜)/M .
Define Y (t) = r˜−tδN (t)−
t∑
k=1
p˜r˜−k . Then, for t ≤ T , Y (t) is a Martingale w.r.t the filtration {Ft}t≥0, with bounded
differences. In fact |Y (t)− Y (t− 1)| ≤ r˜−T (r˜ + 2). Then, by Azuma-Hoeffding, we have that for ǫ1 > 0,
P (|Y (T )− Y ((1− b)T )| > ǫ1) < 2µ1 (19)
where, µ1 = exp
(
− r˜T ǫ212bT (1+r˜)
)
.
Similarly, for p = q, X(t) = r−tδN (t)−
t∑
k=1
λpr−k, where r = 1 − λ(p+ q)/M = 1− 2λp/M , is a Martingale with
bounded differences for t ≤ T . So, for ǫ2 > 0,
P (|X((1− b)T )−X(0)| > ǫ2) < 2µ2 (20)
where, µ2 = exp
(
− rT ǫ222(1−b)T (1+r)
)
.
For the sake of convenience, we write Y (T )
ǫ1≈ Y ((1 − b)T ) and X((1 − b)T ) ǫ2≈ X(0) with probability 2µ1 and 2µ2
respectively, instead of (19) and (20). This implies, with probability µ1 and µ2,
δN (T )
ǫ′1≈ r˜bT δN((1 − b)T ) +
T∑
k=(1−b)T+1
p˜r˜T−k
and,
δN((1 − b)T )
ǫ′2≈ r(1−b)T δN (0) +
(1−b)T∑
k=1
pλr(1−b)T−k
respectively. Here ǫ′1 = r˜
T ǫ1 and ǫ
′
2 = r
(1−b)T ǫ2.
By the union bound, with probability µ1 + µ2, for a suitable ǫ > 0,
δN (T )
ǫ≈ r˜bT r(1−b)T δN(0) + r˜bT
(1−b)T∑
k=1
pλr(1−b)T−k
+
T∑
k=(1−b)T+1
p˜r˜T−k
ǫ≈ r˜bT r(1−b)T δN(0) + p˜
p˜+ q˜
(
1− r˜bT )
+
r˜bT
2
(1 − r(1−b)T ). (21)
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It is easy to verify that the expressions in (18) and (21) match. This concludes the proof.
This generalizes the concentration result in [6] in one direction. However, note that in Proposition 2 of [6], the assumption
p = q was not required. From the above proof, we know that in the no external influence time period
E[δN (t+ 1)|Ft] = λp
M
+ δN (t)
(
1− 2λp
M
)
+
(p− q)
M
(1− δN (t)(1 − λ)).
Thus for p > q, X(t) defined above is a supermartingale, (while for p < q it is a submartingale), however, since
the corresponding solution of the O.D.E. is fairly complicated, it is difficult to conclude similar high-probability results
for closeness of the solutions of the recursion and the corresponding O.D.E. We rely on the simulations (Figure 1) to
demonstrate this.
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